In Canada the term “malicious prosecution” refers to a tort (civil wrong) against the Crown attorney for improperly initiating or proceeding with criminal prosecution.*
The word “malicious” is quite misleading here. It does not denote spite on the part of the prosecutor; rather it refers to an improper purpose or a claim without merit. For example, if a crown attorney is bull-headed in pursuing a case even if there’s credible evidence suggesting otherwise, he or she may be liable in a civil court for the tort of malicious prosecution.
Since the first case involving malicious prosecution was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in Nelles v. Ontario+ two decades ago, there has been few cases of such nature by appellate courts, until now. The case Miazga v. Kvello Estate.^ from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, is currently before the Supreme Court of Canada.
The case involves the prosecution of several foster parents on allegations of serious sexual abuse in the early 1990′s. The Crown attorney, Maththew Miazga, advised the police to lay charges against the foster parents if they thought the accused were guilty. Miazga was accused of adopting very aggressive tactics during the trial.
Years after the criminal proceeding, the former accused sued Miazga (among others) for damages as a result of the unwarranted claims. At trial, the plaintiffs were successful. However, the appeal by one of the defendants was unaminously allowed, while the Miazga’s was dismissed setting the scene for the current case before the Supreme Court of Canada.
Nine attorneys general and the Canadian Association of Crown Counsels have intervened in support of the appellant, Miazga, while the Criminal Lawyers Association (Ontario) (CLA), the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and the Association in Defence of the Wrongly Convicted have intervened for the respondents (the original plaintiffs).
In a recent article** by Sean Dewart, counsel for the CLA, he indicates that the CLA‘s position is to apply well-established principles of criminal law to the case, namely that “the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime.”++
What new developments the wise men and women on the panel will bring to us remain to be seen.
*While the tort of malicious prosecution is largely found to originate from criminal proceedings, this is not exclusively the case. For example, it may be applied to disciplinary hearings. See e.g. Griffin v. Summerside (City of (2006), 768 A.P.R. 88.
+[1989] 2 S.C.R. 170
^ Docket 32208 (Judgment Reserved)
**Sean Dewart, “Supreme Court Pondering Malicious Prosecution, Again” For the Defence 30:2 24.
++ R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16


