Lawyer Talk

Can “Too Much” Medical Care Amount to Child Abuse?

When most people think of child abuse and neglect, a certain grim picture comes to mind. The neglected or abused child may be malnourished or suffering from psychological, physical, or sexual abuse.

The recent case involving a family featured on the popular reality TV series Extreme Makeover: Home Edition raises an issue not commonly seen in child protection proceedings: unnecessary and excessive medical treatment that amounts to child abuse.

The Cerda family, living in Las Vegas at the time, pleaded with the producers of the show for rescue from their mould-filled house. The toxic environment was making life very difficult for the mother and the two daughters, who suffered from serious immune disorders.

The Cerdas’ story seemed to have struck a chord with the producers of the show.

The producers paid to demolish the Cerda family’s old house and built, from the ground up, an opulent new home equipped with a top-grade air filtration system, an elevator, a solar-heated swimming pool, and a gourmet kitchen, to name just a few of the highlights.

Alas, because of “the increased cost” of operating the home, the family put up their new-and-improved place for sale and moved to Oregon.

But as fate would have it, after the move, the Cerda family’s high profile attracted the attention of the child welfare agencies. Several doctors and social workers began to question the mother’s insistence on the chronic medical conditions of her daughters in the face of contradictory lab results.

In February 2011, the State of Oregon took temporary custody of the two children. In the legal proceeding that ensued, six doctors testified on the State’s behalf that the two children did not live in constant medical peril as claimed by the mother.*

The court was told by one expert witness, called by the State, that the children suffered from medical abuse, namely excessive and unnecessary medical interventions that could result in psychological and emotional harm.

The family’s lawyer called the mother to testify about the medical history of the children. However, no doctors were called by the defense.

Judge Norby of the Clackamas County Circuit Court in Oregon found the mother unconvincing. She called the mother’s conduct “excessive and unjustifiable.” Nevertheless, the judge ruled that the father was a capable parent and could take care of the children’s medical needs. She ordered that the two children be returned to the parents.

This case took place in Oregon and not Ontario; therefore, it may or may not be relevant to Ontario cases. However, it reminds us that abuse can take many forms, including too much medical care.

* Citation currently unavailable.

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

Assessing the Risks of a Defendant Dissipating Assets for a Mareva Injunction

Today’s blog discusses a fine point of law regarding the required evidence in cases involving allegations of fraud before a Mareva injunction (or, in common parlance, a freezing order) can be granted.

The legal prerequisites of a Mareva injunction are well-established:

a) The plaintiff must make full and frank disclosure of all material matters within his or her knowledge.

b) The plaintiff must give particulars of the claim against the defendant.

c) The plaintiff must give grounds for believing that the defendant has assets in the jurisdiction.

d) The plaintiff must give grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the assets being removed from the jurisdiction, disposed of within the jurisdiction, or otherwise dealt with so that the plaintiff will be unable to satisfy a judgment awarded.

e) The plaintiff must give an undertaking as to damages.

In the recently published case Sibley & Associates LP v. Ross,* the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a former employee in the accounting department, had been making periodic unauthorized payments to his mother amounting to at least $310,160.32.

The plaintiff satisfied all criteria above but one. There was no evidence of a real risk that the defendant might dissipate his assets.

The Ontario Superior Court was thus confronted with the question of whether an injunction may be issued in absence of clear evidence that the defendant will likely dissipate his assets where there is allegation of fraud.

Unfortunately, the existing jurisprudence isn’t clear on the point.

One school of jurists takes the position that there should be a “fraud exception.” These jurists believe that if there is allegation of fraud, a Mareva injunction ought to be issued regardless of whether there is a risk that the assets will be dissipated.+

Another school of jurists disagrees, insisting that a Mareva injunction is akin to “execution before judgment” (a matter to be taken very seriously).# Therefore, these jurists hold, such an injunction should not be granted unless all five elements above are satisfied, except under very limited circumstances, regardless of whether fraud is alleged.^

It appeared to the court that both schools have had their own supporters in decisions on this matter. However, at present, there is no definitive answer as to whether a “fraud exception” categorically exists in contemporary Canadian law.

The court declined to carve out an “exception” for fraud. Rather, the judge adopted a programmatic approach, stating that the risk of removal or dissipation can be established not only from direct evidence, but also by inference from surrounding circumstances, including the circumstances of the fraud itself.

In the end, the judge concluded that the evidence of fraud was so strong that, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, it gave rise to an inference of a real risk of dissipation or removal of assets.

*[2011] ONSC 2951; (2011) 106 O.R. (3d) 494

+see e.g. Campbell v. Campbell [1881] O.J. No. 201 (Ct. Ch.); Mills v. Petrovic (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 238 (H.C.J.)

#Lister & Co. v. Stubbs (1890), 45 Ch. D. 1

^see e.g. Cital v. Rothbart (1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 513



This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

Non-Custodial (Access) Parents’ Rights

What are the rights of the non-custodial parent after separation or divorce?

In Ontario, the non-custodial parent has certain fundamental rights and obligations under the law. Unfortunately, there seems to be a great deal of confusion about them.

There are actually two types of non-custodial parents: those who have joint or shared custody but do not live with the children, and those who do not have legal custody.

If a parent shares the custody but does not live with the children, that parent is nonetheless entitled to make major decisions on behalf of the children, jointly with the other parent.

If the parent does not have legal custody of the children, the non-custodial parent typically will have access to the child. The right to access to a child includes the right to visit with and be visited by the child and the same rights as a custodial parent to make inquiries and to be given information about the health, education, and welfare of the children, unless a court order or a domestic agreement provides otherwise.*

For example, the non-custodial or access parent’s right may include these rights:

  • the right to receive information from the other parent about the children’s health, education, and well-being, and to be informed about upcoming decisions concerning the children;
  • the right to talk to the children’s doctors, dentists, psychologists, teachers, and school staff, and to have access to the children’s records;
  • the right to attend the children’s school activities;
  • the right to be promptly notified of any emergencies concerning the children;
  • in emergencies, where the custodial parent cannot be located within a reasonable time, the right to give consent to medical, dental, or surgical treatment if the child’s health or safety is in danger.

Readers are cautioned that the list above is not exhaustive. For questions regarding your specific circumstances, you should speak to a licensed lawyer for legal advise.

*Children’s Law Reform Act, s. 20(5)(7)

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

A Spouse’s Right to Possession of the Matrimonial Home

The Ontario Family Law Act has an entire section devoted to dealings with respect to matrimonial homes, although it is only applicable to married couples.* Readers are reminded that this article is not meant to be an exhaustive list of rights and obligations attached to a matrimonial home.

Unsurprising to most, under the law both spouses have an equal right to live at the matrimonial home. (In legal parlance, we call it “a right to possession.”) If only one of the spouses has an interest in a matrimonial home, the other spouse’s right of possession ends when the two cease to be spouses, unless a separation agreement or court order provides otherwise.

A matrimonial home is defined as “every property in which a person has an interest that is ordinarily occupied by the person and the spouse as their family residence.” The definition is wide and includes a residential unit owned by a corporation of which one spouse is a shareholder.

The right to possession of a matrimonial home is a personal right apart from any property interest. It does not create an interest in the mortgage or against third-party creditors.+

To cure the potential hazard of third-party creditors enforcing existing security agreements (e.g., foreclosure or power of sale) and thereby interfering with a person’s right to live at the matrimonial home, the spouse who does not have a legal interest in the home is entitled to notice and has the right of redemption.^

Finally, the law does allow a spouse to apply for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home under certain circumstances. In other words, the court has the authority to abrogate the other spouse’s right to possession.

*R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, as am, Part II

+See e.g. Miller v. Miller (1996) R.F.L. (4th) 191 (Ont. C.A.); Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. v. Riviera Farm Holdings (1998), 39 R.F.L. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.); and Royal Bank v. King (1991), 35 R.F.L. (3d) 325 (Ont. Gen. Div.)

^Family Law Act, supra, s. 22

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

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On Certificates of Pending Litigation in Family Law

A certificate of pending litigation (in legalese, also referred to as lis pendens) is a notice to third parties that interests in a piece of land are currently in dispute before the courts.

The certificate of pending litigation may only be issued under a court order and is only effective in Ontario once properly registered.* Although in theory the certificate does not prohibit individuals from further dealings with the real property in dispute, in effect few purchasers will consider buying a piece of land that comes with questionable ownership.

Although they are generally considered a temporary relief in the context of civil litigation, certificates of pending litigation are available in family law if the legal requirements are met.^ More specifically, the applicant must demonstrate to the court, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she has an interest in the land in dispute.

A claim for issuing a certificate of pending litigation may be made by motion without notice to the respondents (or, in legalese, on an ex parte basis).

To prevent abuse of motions made without reasonable grounds, the Courts of Justice Act stipulates that a party who registers a certificate of pending litigation without a reasonable claim is liable for any damages by any person as a result of its registration.

In practice, the moving party seeking a certificate of pending litigation is required to file an undertaking as to damages. The person seeking the relief will have to undertake to abide by any order concerning damages that the court may make if it ultimately appears that the granting of the order has caused damage to the responding party for which the moving party ought to compensate.#

*Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. C.43, s.103, see also Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O 1990, Reg. 194, R. 40.

^Reicher v. Reicher (1980), 20 R.F.L. (2d) 213

#Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, R. 40.03

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

On Freezing Assets and Preservation Orders in Family Law

A spouse may not transfer away his or her properties in contemplation of death or separation. To do so offends the law.+

If there are grounds to believe that one spouse may deplete his or her assets in an effort to defeat the other’s entitlement under the Ontario Family Law Act, the court may make a temporary or final preservation order to preserve the assets. In common parlance, this is typically referred to as a “freezing” order.*

The purpose of the preservation order is to ensure that there are sufficient assets to satisfy the final payment for property division when it is eventually ordered.^

Besides the ability to restrain the spouse from depleting his or her own assets, the court may also order the possession, delivering, and safekeeping of the property.

For example, sometimes the parties cannot agree on their respective entitlements to the matrimonial home when it is sold (it happens more often than you might think). In such a case, the court may order that the proceeds of the sale be held in trust in the real estate lawyer’s account until the matter is resolved, either by agreement or by trial.

The provision in the Family Law Act is not exhaustive. It does not exclude a spouse from invoking other pieces of legislation concurrently to recover properties when a preservation order is not sufficient.

*s. 12

+Stone v. Stone (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 31 (S.C.J.), aff’d (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 491

^Lasch v. Lasch (1988), 13 R.F.L. (3d) 434 (Ont. H.C.J.), see also Bronfman v. Bronfman (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 366 (S.C.J.)

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

Matrimonial Revenge Served Piping Hot… and Backfiring

The Globe and Mail published an article on “divorce pranks” today.* They include the following:

  • Ex-husband dumped a 20-ton rock on ex-wife’s driveway, spray-painted “Bonne Fete” (happy birthday) and topped with a pink bow. The explanation: “She never had a rock big enough.”
  • Wine collector husband left the matrimonial home. Wife went to the wine cellar, steam-peeled the labels off, and then mixed the bottles up.
  • Wife poured the husband’s wine collection down the sewer.
  • Wife disabled the husband’s car when it was discovered in a compromising position, parked in front of the mistress’s house.
  • Wife went on a shopping spree on the husband’s secondary credit card before it was cancelled.
  • Husband stapled a spider to his cheque for spousal support, which the wife must endorse to cash it.

Readers are warned not to try any of these acts of revenge (and stupidity) because they almost always backfire. In fact, I’ve never come across one that hasn’t. These pranks inevitably will be submitted into evidence, which makes the judge wonder, “What else is this person capable of doing?”

Divorce is a traumatic experience. Don’t let the emotions take over the better part of you. Do what’s rational and logical, and try to resolve the situation. We’re here to help.

*Zosia Bielski, “Divorce Pranks: You Might Think It’s Funny, but the Judge Won’t Laugh,” The Globe and Mail (19 August 2011) Online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/relationships/love/divorce/divorce-pranks-you-might-think-its-funny-but-the-judge-wont-laugh/article2134193/>

Major Pet Store Chain Announces End of Puppy Sales: The Evils of Puppy Mills

Major pet store chain PJ’s Pets has announced that its stores will stop selling puppies on September 1, 2011, reports The Toronto Star.+ Rather than sell puppies, the chain will promote pet adoption from animal shelters or humane societies.

I applaud this decision. Puppies available for sale at retailers are often purchased from brokers that provide the retailers with puppies that are competitively priced but of questionable origins.

Many puppies sold at retail stores are from “puppy mills,” where mother dogs are constantly impregnated without regard to their health. The environment of puppy mills is typically unsanitary and overcrowded.

The mother dogs are typically confined in small cages without exercise or adequate care. They may spend their days in their own feces and urine. Some are put in stacked cages with wire flooring that injures their paws and legs. Some spend their entire useful life outdoors without shelter from the elements. Serious medical conditions that are common at puppy mills include malnutrition, parasites, urine burns, rotten teeth, severely overgrown nails, matted fur, skin diseases, blindness, ear infections, wire cuts and open wounds, and overall weakness.

Once the breeding dog has gone beyond its prime (usually at 4 years of age), it is often discarded, abandoned, or killed. The lucky ones are shot; the unlucky ones are starved to death.

The misery isn’t confined to the mother dogs. Upon their arrival at the retailer, the puppies are left in the display windows for prolonged periods of time without adequate care, socialization, or exercise. Prolonged isolation, inadequate care, and lack of socialization are detrimental to a puppy’s overall development. Because of the mistreatment of mother dogs, store-bought puppies are often born with defects that lead to a lifetime of poor health.

At times, new pet parents discover serious health problems in their new pets shortly after the purchase. When this happens, the new pet owner faces a grim dilemma of either putting the pet down or facing substantial veterinary expenses. (Most retailers do not accept returns.) Perhaps a handful of owners sue in small claims court for damages, with limited success.

Such are the evils of puppy mills.

+Vanessa Lu, “PJ’s Pets Ends Puppy Sales” The Toronto Star (16 August 2011) online: <http://www.thestar.com/business/article/1040266>

Legalese Dictionary: What Makes a Matrimonial Home?

In family law cases, the term “matrimonial home” seems to be cropping up left, right, and centre. What makes a matrimonial home? Today’s blog provides readers with a brief overview of the legal definition of a matrimonial home in Ontario.

Under Ontario’s Family Law Act,* the matrimonial home is defined as (1) every property in which at least one of the spouses has an interest and (2) every property that the spouses ordinarily occupy as their family residence or that was so occupied at the time of separation.

The legal definition above is further subject to two additional rules: (a) there is a deemed interest where the residence is owned by a corporation and occupied by the corporation’s owner or shareholder, and (b) in a residence on a piece of property that is normally used for non-residential purposes, the matrimonial home is limited to the part of the property used for residential purposes.

To explain these two rules a bit:

(a) Deemed interest

Where the residence ordinarily occupied by the spouses is owned by a corporation of which a spouse owns shares, the spouse owning the shares is deemed to have an interest in the unit, and that unit would then qualify as the matrimonial home.

In other words, legal control over the corporation amounts to legal control over the residence for the purposes of the matrimonial provisions. If a company has passed a resolution entitling its owner to reside in the home, it would be a matrimonial home.^

(b) Matrimonial home on non-residential property

If the property that includes a matrimonial home is normally used for a purpose other than residential (say, for farming), the matrimonial home is only the part that may reasonably be regarded as necessary to the use and enjoyment of the residence.

For example, where 75% of the house was used for a commercial boarding operation, the matrimonial home was only deemed to be the 25% used for non-commercial purposes.+

In another example at the opposite end of the spectrum, where the matrimonial home was situated on a piece of farmland that was not economically viable, but the farmland was necessary for the enjoyment of a rural residence, the entire farm was deemed a matrimonial home.**

*R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3

^Debora v. Debora [2006] O.J. No. 4826 (C.A.)

+Kozlowski v. Kozlowski (1984) 39 R.F.L. (2d) 34 (Ont. H.C.J.)

**Sample v. Sample (1985) 44 R.F.L. (2d) 167 (Ont. H.C.J.)

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

A Brief Note on S. 7 Special or Extraordinary Expenses under the Child Support Guidelines

Under the Child Support Guidelines,* the court may award additional child support payable for expenses not covered under the table amount. Among practitioners, the additional support payable is often referred to as “section 7 expenses,” while the regulation refers to it as “extraordinary or special expenses.” For the purposes of this article, we will call the additional support payable an “add-on.”

Under the Guidelines, the court may award add-ons upon the request of a parent. Typically, the add-ons may include the following:

  • daycare expenses
  • dental or medical insurance premiums attributable to the child
  • health-related expenses exceeding $100 after insurance reimbursement
  • extraordinary expenses of educational programs that meet the child’s best interests
  • post-secondary education
  • extraordinary expenses of extracurricular programs

In deciding the appropriate amount payable, the court must consider the necessity and the reasonableness of the expenses incurred, the best interests of the child, the means of the parents, and the spending pattern during cohabitation or marriage.

Since the Guidelines came into force, there have been disputes over what constitutes an “extraordinary expense.” Do swimming lessons count? What about training for the Olympics for competitive swimming?

To clear things up, the regulation was amended to include the definition of “extraordinary expenses.” To be qualified as an extraordinary expense under the Guidelines, an expense must exceed what the parent requesting the add-on can reasonably cover.

In the alternative, the court may consider the expenses extraordinary after taking the following factors into consideration:

  1. the amount in relation to the income of the parent requesting the add-on,
  2. the nature and the number of the educational or extracurricular activities,
  3. the special needs or talent of the child,
  4. the overall cost of the program, and
  5. any other factor that the court considers relevant.

The expenses are shared by the parents in proportion to their income, rather than split down the middle fifty-fifty.

*O. Reg. 391/97, s. 7

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

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