Case Digest/Comments

Publication Ban in Williams’s Divorce Is Set Aside

The divorce involving the notorious convicted serial killer Russell Williams has taken another detour in the Court of Appeal.*

Williams’s wife, identified only as M.E.H., obtained a publication ban and a sealing order by motion from the Superior Court of Justice on April 12, 2011. Various media outlets then intervened and appealed the publication ban.+

On January 24, 2012, the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside the challenged provisions under the publication ban, unless the ban is further ordered by the court within 14 days.

In its reasoning, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge correctly identified the legal principles relating to publication bans and sealing orders. However, the evidence at bar could not support that the order was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice. Absent that finding, said the Court of Appeal, “the orders could not have been made under the controlling jurisprudence.”

Under the jurisprudence, a publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.^

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the wife’s right to go to court without fear of harm. “Access to the court should not come at the cost of a substantial risk of serious debilitating emotion or physical harm to the party seeking access,” said the Court of Appeal.

However, in the Court of Appeal’s opinion, the evidence provided by the wife wasn’t enough to justify a sealing order. In particular, the Court of Appeal could not find evidence that the media’s access to items covered by the publication ban would in any way negatively affect the wife’s ability to fully participate in the proceeding. In other words, the dangers of harm claimed by the wife had not been substantiated.

*2012 ONCA 0035

+See my previous post, “On Publication Bans and Sealing Orders in Family Law,” August 17, 2011

^R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, at para. 32

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

‘Tis the Season for Holiday Scams

Yesterday we had our first snowfall in Toronto for the season. Undoubtedly, the holidays are coming.

People are either preoccupied with the coming holidays (Christmas, Kwanza, Hanukkah, Ashura, Boxing Day, New Year’s Day … take your pick) or are looking forward to taking time off work. No doubt, major financial institutions will also be closed for a few days, thereby delaying the clearing of cheques.

While people are otherwise occupied, scammers and fraudsters are taking  advantage of the combination of bank closures and holiday distractions to defraud their victims.

Dan Pennington of LawPRO has said that bad cheque scams are on the rise and warned lawyers taking large sums of trust funds to be vigilant.* He said the scams are becoming more and more sophisticated. Some of the bad cheques could even fool bank tellers.

According to Pennington, a lawyer from St. Catharines was recently suspended for misappropriating trust funds after he was defrauded with fake cheques. The funds from the fake cheques did not clear and resulted in a shortfall in his trust account. The lawyer tried to cover the loss with other clients’ money held in trust. But the shortfall soon became too large, and the lawyer became the subject of an investigation.

In addition to bad cheque scams, “Oklahoma frauds” are resurfacing, according to Jeffrey W. Lem, a partner in the real estate group at Miller Thomson LLP.^ A recent lawsuit was brought alleging $6.5 million in damages as a result of mortgage frauds.

Lem explained in a nutshell how an Oklahoma fraud operates. A fraudster buys a piece of land for a small amount, say $10,000, in an otherwise legitimate transaction. The fraudster then flips the property to an accomplice for a grossly inflated price, say $500,000. The accomplice then goes to the lender for a mortgage against the inflated property value. Typically, the fraudsters rapidly target a single mortgage lender several times before they take off with the proceeds. The lender then is left with collateral properties worth a fraction of the mortgaged value.

*Michael McKiernan, “St. Catharines case shows pitfalls of fake cheques” Law Times (28 November 2011) 13

^Jeffrey W. Lem, “Oklahoma frauds return as scam of choice” Law Times (28 November 2011) 7

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

Annulment of Marriages in Ontario

Annulment of marriage in law is quite rare in Ontario. As opposed to a divorce, which dissolves a valid marriage, an annulment has the same effect as the marriage’s having never taken place.

Annulment of marriages finds its statutory authority from the Annulment of Marriages Act (Ontario).* The statute is short, containing only 3 paragraphs. It merely states that the part of the law of England that pertains to the annulment of marriage on July 15, 1870, is continued in Ontario in so far as it has not been repealed or changed.

Needless to say, the content of the statute doesn’t provide much insight to readers (lawyers and judges alike) who are not historians of the state of British law on July 15, 1870. Rather, lawyers and judges rely on case law to decide whether a particular marriage should be annulled.

In the recent decision Sahibalzubaidi v. Bahjat of the Ontario Superior Court, the judge heard an application brought by the wife seeking to have the marriage annulled. She alleged non-completion of the ceremony, fraud, and non-consummation of marriage.^

The marriage was to take place in Malaysia according to the Islamic tradition. They had a civil ceremony and the marriage was registered with the local authority. However, the wife felt still unmarried until the religious ceremonies were performed and would not engage in sexual intercourse until then.

Shortly after the civil marriage, the wife sponsored the husband for immigration to Canada.

Upon his arrival in Canada, the husband turned out to be abusive and threatening. The religious ceremonies were never performed, and hence the wife never consummated the marriage because, in her mind, she had not been properly married.

In deciding whether to grant the annulment, the presiding judge considered at length the case Torfehnejad v. Salimi, affirmed by the Court of Appeal.+

The judge dismissed the part of the application based on non-completion of ceremony and fraud, citing that there was insufficient evidence to vitiate the marriage.

In particular, the judge noted that to allow a marriage to be annulled based on fraud, the alleged fraud must have induced an operative mistake to the marriage, such as one’s identity.# Mere misrepresentation of one’s character isn’t enough. (I suspect many would rush to apply for annulment if such a ground were available.)

Although the first two bases of the application were dismissed for want of evidence, the judge accepted the wife’s evidence that the marriage was never consummated. Following an Alberta decision of Jomha v. Jomha, the court held that

an annulment may be granted where the marriage is not consummated by reasons of an invincible repugnance or impossibility in the mind of at least one of the parties, akin to a psychological abhorrence, to engage in sexual intercourse with the marriage partner.&

Given that the wife’s strongly held religious beliefs prevented her from consummating the marriage prior to the religious ceremonies that never happened, the court granted the annulment on that basis.

*R.S.C. 1970 c. A-14

^ (2011), 107 O.R. (3d) 53; 2011 ONSC 4075

+[2006] O.J. No. 4633 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff’d [2008] O.J. No. 3165, 2008 ONCA 583

# Iantsis v. Papatheodorou, [1971] 1 O.R. 245, O.J. No. 1642 (C.A.)

& [2010] A.J. No. 219, 2010 ABQB 135

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

Ex-Lovers’ Quarrel: Was It a Gift or a Loan?

Here’s a classic dispute between former lovers.

The boyfriend gave the girlfriend money to buy a car. The two broke up. The girlfriend sold the car. The boyfriend wanted his money back. He said it was a loan; she said it was a gift.

Who was right?

In the recent decision of Devries Financial Group Inc. v. Duggan, the judge held that it was neither a loan nor a gift.* Rather, it was a resulting trust.

In Devries, the boyfriend sued in the capacity of a corporation. (I suspect that the plaintiff wanted to distance his former relationship with the defendant, but this is only my speculation.) However, the judge found that the plaintiff corporation and its sole director and shareholder, Mr. Devries, were indistinguishable for the purposes of deciding the lawsuit.

Mr. Devries, a sophisticated licensed financial adviser, advanced the funds to the defendant (then-girlfriend) Ms. Duggan to buy a car. Soon after, the relationship turned sour and the two broke up.

Ms. Duggan decided that she could no longer afford the car after the breakup and sold the car for a significant loss. Mr. Devries wanted to recover the funds from her.

The judge found that Mr. Devries couldn’t establish the transfer of the funds as a loan in the face of Ms. Duggan’s denial. The judge reasoned that, given Mr. Devries’s profession (a licensed financial adviser), it was unlikely that he would have advanced funds without proper instruments if the transaction were a loan.

Rather, the judge reasoned that the advancement of funds for the purchase of a car created a rebuttable presumption of result trust. When the transaction is challenged, the onus is on the transferee to establish that a gift was intended.

In this case, the judge reasoned that it was unlikely the funds were transferred as a gift given the short duration of the relationship.

In the absence of additional evidence supporting the transfer of the funds as a gift, the defendant was declared as a trustee of the car and ordered to repay the funds, after deducting her financial loss, depreciation, and unpaid services in the amount of $8,000.

* 2011 ONSC 3773, 106 O.R. (3d) 682 (sm. cl. ct.)

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

Can “Too Much” Medical Care Amount to Child Abuse?

When most people think of child abuse and neglect, a certain grim picture comes to mind. The neglected or abused child may be malnourished or suffering from psychological, physical, or sexual abuse.

The recent case involving a family featured on the popular reality TV series Extreme Makeover: Home Edition raises an issue not commonly seen in child protection proceedings: unnecessary and excessive medical treatment that amounts to child abuse.

The Cerda family, living in Las Vegas at the time, pleaded with the producers of the show for rescue from their mould-filled house. The toxic environment was making life very difficult for the mother and the two daughters, who suffered from serious immune disorders.

The Cerdas’ story seemed to have struck a chord with the producers of the show.

The producers paid to demolish the Cerda family’s old house and built, from the ground up, an opulent new home equipped with a top-grade air filtration system, an elevator, a solar-heated swimming pool, and a gourmet kitchen, to name just a few of the highlights.

Alas, because of “the increased cost” of operating the home, the family put up their new-and-improved place for sale and moved to Oregon.

But as fate would have it, after the move, the Cerda family’s high profile attracted the attention of the child welfare agencies. Several doctors and social workers began to question the mother’s insistence on the chronic medical conditions of her daughters in the face of contradictory lab results.

In February 2011, the State of Oregon took temporary custody of the two children. In the legal proceeding that ensued, six doctors testified on the State’s behalf that the two children did not live in constant medical peril as claimed by the mother.*

The court was told by one expert witness, called by the State, that the children suffered from medical abuse, namely excessive and unnecessary medical interventions that could result in psychological and emotional harm.

The family’s lawyer called the mother to testify about the medical history of the children. However, no doctors were called by the defense.

Judge Norby of the Clackamas County Circuit Court in Oregon found the mother unconvincing. She called the mother’s conduct “excessive and unjustifiable.” Nevertheless, the judge ruled that the father was a capable parent and could take care of the children’s medical needs. She ordered that the two children be returned to the parents.

This case took place in Oregon and not Ontario; therefore, it may or may not be relevant to Ontario cases. However, it reminds us that abuse can take many forms, including too much medical care.

* Citation currently unavailable.

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

On Certificates of Pending Litigation in Family Law

A certificate of pending litigation (in legalese, also referred to as lis pendens) is a notice to third parties that interests in a piece of land are currently in dispute before the courts.

The certificate of pending litigation may only be issued under a court order and is only effective in Ontario once properly registered.* Although in theory the certificate does not prohibit individuals from further dealings with the real property in dispute, in effect few purchasers will consider buying a piece of land that comes with questionable ownership.

Although they are generally considered a temporary relief in the context of civil litigation, certificates of pending litigation are available in family law if the legal requirements are met.^ More specifically, the applicant must demonstrate to the court, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she has an interest in the land in dispute.

A claim for issuing a certificate of pending litigation may be made by motion without notice to the respondents (or, in legalese, on an ex parte basis).

To prevent abuse of motions made without reasonable grounds, the Courts of Justice Act stipulates that a party who registers a certificate of pending litigation without a reasonable claim is liable for any damages by any person as a result of its registration.

In practice, the moving party seeking a certificate of pending litigation is required to file an undertaking as to damages. The person seeking the relief will have to undertake to abide by any order concerning damages that the court may make if it ultimately appears that the granting of the order has caused damage to the responding party for which the moving party ought to compensate.#

*Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. C.43, s.103, see also Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O 1990, Reg. 194, R. 40.

^Reicher v. Reicher (1980), 20 R.F.L. (2d) 213

#Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, R. 40.03

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

On Freezing Assets and Preservation Orders in Family Law

A spouse may not transfer away his or her properties in contemplation of death or separation. To do so offends the law.+

If there are grounds to believe that one spouse may deplete his or her assets in an effort to defeat the other’s entitlement under the Ontario Family Law Act, the court may make a temporary or final preservation order to preserve the assets. In common parlance, this is typically referred to as a “freezing” order.*

The purpose of the preservation order is to ensure that there are sufficient assets to satisfy the final payment for property division when it is eventually ordered.^

Besides the ability to restrain the spouse from depleting his or her own assets, the court may also order the possession, delivering, and safekeeping of the property.

For example, sometimes the parties cannot agree on their respective entitlements to the matrimonial home when it is sold (it happens more often than you might think). In such a case, the court may order that the proceeds of the sale be held in trust in the real estate lawyer’s account until the matter is resolved, either by agreement or by trial.

The provision in the Family Law Act is not exhaustive. It does not exclude a spouse from invoking other pieces of legislation concurrently to recover properties when a preservation order is not sufficient.

*s. 12

+Stone v. Stone (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 31 (S.C.J.), aff’d (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 491

^Lasch v. Lasch (1988), 13 R.F.L. (3d) 434 (Ont. H.C.J.), see also Bronfman v. Bronfman (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 366 (S.C.J.)

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

On Runaway Brides (or Grooms)

What happens when a lawyer engaged to another lawyer cancels the wedding at the last minute?

Your guessed right: a lawsuit.

Earlier this year, the Chicago Tribune reported a story about a woman suing her ex-fiance for a called-off wedding. The woman claimed $62,814.71 in expenses for a wedding that never happened, including the wedding dress ($5,000), the honeymoon ($7,000), and the reservation at a Ritz-Carlton (amount unknown).

Thankfully, brides and grooms in Ontario can take comfort in knowing that breach of promise of marriage has been abolished in Ontario since August 1, 1978, by the Marriage Act, which stipulates that “no action may be brought for a breach of a promise to marry or for any damages resulting therefrom.”^

What about the engagement ring?

It should be returned, regardless of who called off the wedding.+

*Cynthia Dizikes, “Jilted Bride Sues for $62,814,” Chicago Tribune (4 March, 2011) online: Chicago Tribune <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-03-04/news/ct-met-jilted-bride-20110304_1_wedding-dress-bridal-gown-lawsuit>

^R.S.O. c.M.3, s. 32

+Ibid., s. 33

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

Bell Canada Settles Complaint on Misleading Advertisements; Agrees to Pay $10 Million Fine

Bell Canada recently settled a complaint brought by the Commissioner of Competition with respect to misleading advertising under the federal Competition Act* by filing a consent agreement with the regulating tribunal. Under the terms of the settlement, Bell Canada is obliged to pay an administrative fine of $10 million, which is the maximum monetary penalty available under the legislation.

The Commissioner of Competition alleged that many of the services by Bell aren’t available at the advertised price because of hidden fees. For example, consumers who pay the advertised home phone service price must also pay a touch tone fee. Similarly, in providing high-speed internet, Bell charges modem rental fees in addition to the advertised price.

Toronto lawyers James B. Musgrove and Daniel G. Edmondstone of McMillan LLP think that the Commissioner’s pursuit of the maximum administrative fine may be the clearest message to retailers who utilize “add-on” or “hidden fee” advertising structures.

In addition to the administrative fine, Bell Canada also agreed to pay for the Commissioner’s legal fees in the amount of $100,000.

*R.S.C. 1985, c C-34

Separation Agreements Are Subject to Best Interests of Child and Child Support Guidelines

Can you do anything you want in a separation agreement? In Ontario, the answer is no, even if the rules of natural justice are observed.

In both the Family Law Act* and the Children’s Law Reform Act,^ the law stipulates that all domestic contracts, including separation agreements, are subject to the best interests of the children.

For example, the parents can’t agree to never send their school-aged children to school. Nor may parents agree to leave their infants unattended at any time.

Besides the above, the Family Law Act also stipulates that domestic contracts are presumably subject to the Child Support Guidelines, even if the domestic contract addressed was entered into under the authority of another jurisdiction. Provisions not compliant with the Child Support Guidelines may be found unenforceable by the courts of Ontario.

In Blagaich v. Blagaich,+ the parties entered into a divorce settlement in the state of Maryland. The terms of the settlement were subsequently incorporated into a divorce order issed by the local court. The order provided that child support payments were to cease when the child reached the age of 18 or graduated from high school (which is inconsistent with the Federal Child Support Guidelines). The parties also stipulated that the settlement was to be governed under the laws of Maryland, and that the Maryland courts would have jurisdiction over the matter.

The Ontario Superior Court found that once the parties have attorned to (legal jargon for “submitted to the jurisdiction of”) the Ontario court, or once the Ontario court has assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, the separation agreement (or divorce settlement) must comply with the laws of Ontario if it is to be enforceable.

Under the laws of Ontario, in determining the issue of child support payable under domestic contracts (including separation agreements, or in the present case, an order issued on consent of the parties according to the minutes of settlement), a court may disregard any provision that is unreasonable under the Child Support Guidelines.

In the end, the payor was ordered to pay child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines and the Family Law Act, notwithstanding the provision terminating support when the child reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school contained in the consent order issued by the Maryland court.

*R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3., as am., s. 33, 56 and 58

^R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, as am., s. 20, 22, and 24

+2007 CanLII 37325 (ON SC)

This blog is provided for your reference only and is not a substitute for the law. The law may have changed since the publication of this article. This article is not legal advice and should not be regarded as such.

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